

JUL 20 2007

Statement of CAPT [REDACTED]
F/V BUONA MADRE sinking
July 13-14, 2007

At approximately 1730 on 13 July 2007 I received a call from Commander [REDACTED] at my office informing me of a possible collision between a small cargo vessel and a fishing vessel off of Point Reyes in the vicinity of the north bound traffic lane. I asked if we launched all available assets to which he replied that Air Station SF and Station Bodega Bay were launched and Station Golden Gate was going to be launched since the possible casualty was near the dividing line of the two stations' AORs. He also stated that a UMIB was issued and that additional information would be forthcoming.

Approximately a half hour later LT [REDACTED] (the SDO) came in my office and requested permission to stand down all units based on the premise it was a false alarm. She explained that the reason the ship thought she was in a collision was because they were in communication with a fishing vessel to make passing arrangements, and lost radar contact and communications. The freight vessel later regained them with the fishing vessel they thought they hit. The name of the fishing vessel was F/V MARTHA or F/V MARJA. The name of the freight vessel was M/V EVA DANIELSEN. She also told me that the VTS had checked with other fishing vessels in the area concerning the UMIB and that no missing vessels were reported. In addition the M/V EVA DANIELSEN had stopped after the possible collision and found no evidence of a damaged fishing vessel, and had even checked her bow for scrapings and found none. This information was also confirmed by Commander [REDACTED] who called me shortly afterwards. Based on the above I gave the order to stop the active search and return all units to their bases.

The following morning at approximately 0830 I received a call at home from the Sector Duty Officer stating that a body had been discovered by a fishing vessel named F/V CALIFORNIA GIRL in the near proximity of the possible collision the previous afternoon. We immediately launched Station Bodega Bay and ASSF and conducted EXCOMS to determine the name of the vessel and whether there were any survivors. After learning the name of the vessel (F/V BUONA MADRE) from the debris field found, and the name of the deceased PIW (Mr. Paul Wade), it was determined that Mr. Wade had been fishing solo. I then gave the order to suspend the search. It appeared that the F/V BUONA MADRE was involved in a collision. Arrangements were made to hold the M/V EVA DANIELSEN at its next port of call which was Portland, Oregon so the crew could be questioned and the vessel closely examined by Coast Guard personnel. The VTS was also told to provide the names of all vessels which were in the vicinity of the M/V EVA DANIELSEN reported collision position at the time of the reported collision.

The following day Sunday (15 July 2007) I told Commander [REDACTED] that due to the circumstances of this case (a death of a PIW in his life jacket), I wanted a full SAR analysis done of this case. This was started on Monday 16 July 2007 and followed up by District 11.

[REDACTED] CAPT USCG

ENCLOSURE (9.a)

JUL 20 1997

Statement by CDR [REDACTED]
SAR Case Review
F/V BUONA MADRE

On Friday July 13th, I received a voicemail from CDR [REDACTED] at approximately 1750 stating that Sector had just concluded a case involving a possible collision in the vicinity of Pt. Reyes. He stated that the case was resolved when radio contact was reestablished between a merchant vessel and a fishing vessel.

On Saturday July 14th, I received a call at home at approximately 0911 from the SDO stating that Sector had received a report of a body in the water in the vicinity of Pt. Reyes, and to discuss initial search efforts. This call was the first of many throughout the morning and afternoon, including several conference calls with CAPT [REDACTED], CDR [REDACTED] and SCC watchstanders to brief on search efforts and to initiate the first stages of a marine casualty investigation involving the F/V BUONA MADRE.

[REDACTED]
CDR, U.S. Coast Guard

JUL 19 2007

Statement by CDR [REDACTED]
M/V Eva Danielsen Possible Collision on Friday July 13, 2007

1725 (est): I received a call on my home phone from the Sector Duty Officer, LT [REDACTED], notifying me of a possible collision between the M/V Eva Danielsen and a small fishing vessel approximately 6 NM west of Pt. Reyes. I asked her why the M/V thought they had collided with a small F/V and she stated because they lost communications and radar contact with the fishing vessel they had prior passing arrangements with. LT [REDACTED] also informed me that they issued a UMIB, briefed ASSF and Station BB to launch. I inquired to exact position of possible incident and to inform Station Golden Gate since it might drift into the station's Area of Responsibility. I then told her I would brief both CDR [REDACTED] and CAPT [REDACTED] so she could manage the case.

1728: I called CAPT [REDACTED] in his office and informed him of possible case involving collision with M/V and a small fishing vessel. I informed him that we issued a UMIB, launched ASSF and Station Bodega Bay, and that the VTS was trying to locate the missing fishing vessel. I told him I would update him when we had more information.

1735: I started to call CDR [REDACTED] on his office phone when the SDO called me on my home phone. The SDO informed me that she possibly had good news that the suspected missing F/V Martha was located and that 2 other fishing boats were also found to be OK in the area and that we may be standing down. I directed her to have the VTS contact the M/V Eva Danielsen and ask them why they thought they hit a fishing vessel and after a few moments she stated that because of the lost radar contact and communications and that they didn't feel hitting anything. She also informed me that the Master had turned around and didn't find anything in addition to checking own bow for any signs of damage. I stated that I was comfortable with standing down the responding units and I would brief both the CO and Response.

1743: I briefed CO that it was a false alarm and that we were standing down all units since we accounted for the missing fishing vessel and the master didn't feel hitting anything or seeing anything.


1753: I called CDR [REDACTED] on his work number informing him that we thought we had a possible collision case and that we stood down since we located the missing fishing vessel.

14 July 2007

0850 (est): I received a call at home of a body being discovered by a fishing vessel approximately 4 NM west of Pt. Reyes. I informed SDO to conduct tele-conference

9.0

between CO and Response to consider search efforts and possibility that this case
could be a result of previous days possible collision.



JUL 25 1997

On July 13th, 2007 I was the Sector Duty Officer in Sector San Francisco's Command Center.

At approximately 1720, the Command Center received a call from Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) stating that the EVA DANIELSEN thought they might have hit another vessel 6 NM west of Pt. Reyes. Over the next 10-15 minutes amplifying information was obtained from VTS (via video teleconference and/or phone) to clarify the details of their initial report. At approximately 1735 VTS issued an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast UMIB and SECURITE broadcast while the Operational Controller, Mr. [REDACTED], made calls to launch Station Bodega Bay and Air Station San Francisco for response (though with 1/4 NM visibility, I was not confident that Air Station would be able to safely launch). I then briefed CDR [REDACTED] (Command Center Chief) on the information we had - that the EVA DANIELSEN had made passing arrangements with the "F/V MARTHA", that they had this vessel as a contact on their radar, the F/V had come close to the EVA DANIELSEN, and then disappeared from their radar. The EVA DANIELSEN had stopped their vessel in order to conduct a cursory search of the area where they suspected the collision might have occurred. CDR [REDACTED] suggested several additional response options, questions to ask, and offered to help with my initial briefings to CDR [REDACTED] and CAPT [REDACTED].

Through the video teleconference system we were able to keep constant communications with VTS. They relayed to us that the "F/V MARJA" replied to the SECURITE broadcast, that they had made passing arrangements with the EVA DANIELSEN, and that they had not been in a collision. We concluded that "MARJA" had likely been misheard as "MARTHA". The F/V ROGUE was in the same area and also replied that they had not been in a collision. Based on these negative reports, we asked VTS to find out the exact reason the EVA DANIELSEN suspected they had collided with another vessel. The EVA DANIELSEN replied that it was the radar contact alone that had concerned them; they didn't hear or feel anything that would suggest a collision with another vessel. After VTS reported this information I asked if they were confident in the report that had been made by the EVA DANIELSEN and they agreed that they were. Based on the EVA DANIELSEN's report and F/V MARJA's reply, the Operational Controller and I agreed that no collision had occurred.

At approximately 1800 I called CDR [REDACTED] and then CDR [REDACTED] to update them on the case information (I left a message on CDR [REDACTED] cell phone). With LCDR [REDACTED] and CAPT [REDACTED] on leave, my last brief was made in person to CAPT [REDACTED]. All concurred with our assessment that no collision had occurred and to stand down all assets. CAPT [REDACTED] asked for amplifying information on the EVA DANIELSEN's size, cargo, last port of call and next port of call, which I provided.

[REDACTED]

TEL 19 2007

Statement: July 13, 2007
Operations Controller

On July 13, I received a phone call from VTS reporting they received radio call from the Container Vessel Eva Danielson who reported a possible collision with the F/V Marja. I asked VTS Supervisor what makes the Eva Danielson believes they had a collision with the F/V Marja? Did they feel a bump or what? VTS replied the Eva Danielson reported they did not feel a bump but they had made passing arrangements with the F/V Marja and then lost her on radar. The Eva Danielson was also unable to re-establish communications with F/V Marja. VTS also reported that the Eva Danielson turned around and was conducting a search. The communication watch stander made several call outs to the F/V Marja with no reply. VTS immediately issued a UMIB over ch 16. I briefed Air Station San Francisco for launch. Station Golden Gate called the Command Center in response to the UMIB. I gave them a brief and told them that I had already briefed the Helo for launch and was going to brief Station Bodega bay because it was in their AOR. I also informed them that I would call them if I needed them. Seconds after hanging up with Station Golden Gate I briefed Station Bodega for launch. The SDO diverted CGC Hawksbill from Half Moon Bay.. I than opened up a direct line on the Tandberg TELE COMM system so we could pass and received real time information concerning the possible collision. I than started generating search action plans for the Helo and Station Bodega Bay SRU. Just as I was going to fax the search action plan to Air Station San Francisco VTS reported they established communications with F/V Majra. F/V Majar reported to VTS that they did make passing arrangements with Eva Danielson and they did not collide with it. All on the watch floor was in concurrence that based on the information at hand that no collision occurred. All units were stood down.

[REDACTED]
Sector San Francisco, Operations Controller

[REDACTED] LCDR

From: [REDACTED] BM1
Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2007 4:37 PM
To: [REDACTED] LT
Cc: [REDACTED] OSCS; [REDACTED] CDR
Subject: Statement of BM1 [REDACTED]

The following statement is true to the best of my knowledge:

On 13 July 2007 I was the Situational Controller on watch at Sector SF Command Center. VTS reported a possible collision between the Eva Danielsen and a CFV originally thought to be named Martha. The SAR controller launched the Helicopter from AIRSTA San Francisco and a 47' from STA Bodega Bay. We were talking to VTS because they had COMMS with the Eva Danielsen. The Eva Danielsen said the reason they thought they had a collision was because they had lost a contact on radar and had previously made passing arrangements with CFV Martha. We did call outs for CFV Martha, got a response from CFV Marja that stated they had made passing arrangements with Eva Danielsen. They also stated they were still underway and that they had not collided with Eva Danielsen. We asked Eva Danielsen if they had any indication of a collision such as a shutter of their vessel. The Eva Danielsen stated they did not have any indication of a collision. We did not think a collision occurred since we had communications with both vessels. The case was stood down.

BM1 [REDACTED]

LCDR

From: [REDACTED] OS3
Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2007 5:05 PM
To: [REDACTED] LT
Cc: [REDACTED] CDR
Subject: Statement regarding the Buona Madre Case

I was the COMMS watchstander for this case.

I was notified by Mr. [REDACTED] of a VSL, the Eva Daniels, that had reported to VTS they had made passing arrangements with a F/V Martha. It was extremely foggy and visibility was very low. The Eva Daniels had the F/V Martha on their radar and their CPA was close and then they lost the Martha on their radar. They suspected they may have collided with the Martha but had reported they didn't feel any turbulence to indicate this, only that they had lost the Martha from radar and were unable to hail them.

After I was notified by Mr. [REDACTED] I called VTS to set up a PRECOMMS plan. This was an effort to hail the F/V Martha. VTS began making callouts to the Marja on various frequencies that F/V's typically monitor. I began making callouts on CH16 156.8MHz. I also called VSL Assist/Boat US to enlist them in making callouts on other frequencies as well so we could maximize our calling coverage across a wide range of channels in hopes to contact the F/V Martha. The additional reason for other units making callouts is because the radio console at Sector only has CH6, CH16, CH21, CH22, CH81, and CH83. All of these are CG working frequencies, with the exception of CH16, none of which a F/V would monitor.

VTS issued a UMIB at 1731 (0031Z) which STA GG heard and called the command center about. Mr. [REDACTED] informed them of the situation and that it wasn't in their AOR and that he would be launching STA BB to respond. The CGC Hawksbill also heard the UMIB and called sector on CH21 for more information and to inform us they would be diverting to PT Reyes to assist but that visibility was low and they were doubtful they could make best speed.

The command center then received a call from VTS. VTS notified us that they had established comms with the F/V Marja. They confirmed that the Marja was in that general area, that they did make passing arrangements with the Eva Daniels, and that they were OPS NML and all was well and that no collision occurred. The initial VSL reported was the F/V Martha, but it is EXTREMELY common to mispronounce names of VSLs because radios are not the clearest and most crisp forms of communication, and when you factor in that the Eva Daniels is a fairly large VSL, I'm sure it was fairly loud, and also the F/V Marja was probably underway in the wind with a fairly open cabin to transmit from, so some of the outside noise could very well have misconstrued the name Marja for Martha. Not to mention that it is also very common to have language barriers with VSLs coming and going from all over the world, I myself have experienced this sort of mixup, so I would not put it above anyone in any situation.

We all felt very certain and there was no question as to whether a collision had occurred. With the information we received from the report that was made by the Eva Daniels, we had no reason to believe there was a collision or any distress whatsoever. The CG as a whole relies on reporting sources for information on distress and various other incidents. It would make no sense if we responded to things that were not reported. AIRSTA SF was stood down by Mr. [REDACTED]. Simultaneously, PO [REDACTED] from STA BB then called for an update and I informed him of VTS's findings and told him to stand down and he responded positively with no concern. I then called CGC [REDACTED] on CH21 and advised them of the situation and stood them down to which they also responded undoubtedly.

Concurrently, a mayday was transmitted over CH16 and STA GG responded. That mayday had no affect on the execution of the case in question and was unrelated.

In the command center we have multiple cases occurring simultaneously on a frequent basis. We are skilled in multi-tasking and SAR is not a new thing to us as we are one of the busiest sectors in the CG.

Be Swell,
V/R

OS3 [REDACTED]
Sector San Francisco
[REDACTED]

July 23, 2007

Operations Director
Vessel Traffic Service Branch
USCG Sector San Francisco

Personal Statement regarding incident which occurred on Friday, July 13th 2007: possible collision between M/V EVA DANIELSON and an unidentified fishing vessel.

At approximately 1730 on July 13, 2007, I received a cell phone call from Mr. [REDACTED], the Watch Supervisor at the Vessel Traffic Service Operations Center. Mr. [REDACTED] briefed me that the 300 ft. M/V EVA DANIELSON had reported a possible collision with a fishing vessel approximately 6 NM north of Point Reyes. Mr. [REDACTED] also stated that the vessel was in the process of conducting their own search because they could not locate the vessel.

I asked what made them think that they had had a collision. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the vessel made passing arrangements with a vessel named the MARTHA and a short time later the EVA DANIELSON's mate call VTS indicating that they may have hit it. Mr. [REDACTED] also stated that the visibility in the area was very poor, about 200 meters.

I inquired as to whether the SCC was launching any assets, Mr. [REDACTED] stated that they had been briefed and were waiting for additional information/confirmation that a collision had taken place.

Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that the VTS Watch had attempted to hail the FV MARTHA on VHF channels 12, 13 and 16 with negative results.

I asked if there had been any reports of EPIRB hits. His reply was negative and that there had been no distress or other calls on channel 16.

I inquired as to whether any other vessels could be seen in the vicinity. The reply was negative; I directed that the watch ask the EVA DANIELSON if they could see any other vessels in their vicinity. I indicated to Mr. [REDACTED] that oftentimes fishing vessel operators will know each other and if contacted and queried, may be able to help us determine if anyone were missing.

I then inquired about other inbound/outbound traffic (VMRS Users) thru the area. Mr. [REDACTED] replied that there were no arrivals and the next departure would be a couple of hours hence. I told him to ensure that any vessels transiting the area be informed of the incident.

I then instructed him to ensure that the watch continue to closely monitor the situation and to keep me posted; we then ended the phone call.

At approximately 1800, I received another call from Mr. [REDACTED] with an update on the incident. He indicated that they had been in contact with the EVA DANIELSON and that the vessel had conducted a search and inspected their own vessel for any signs of damage, with negative results in both cases. He further indicated that the VTS watch had been able to speak with the vessel that the EVA DANIELSON was thought to have hit, the FV MARJA, as well as the FV ROGUE, also in the immediate vicinity and that both vessels were fine. Based on this information, it appeared that no collision had taken place and that the EVA DANIELSON had been cleared to proceed on its transit north.

I again inquired as what made the EVA DANIELSON believe that they had hit something. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the vessel reported that they'd had a radar contact that they believed to have had made passing arrangements with, that the radar contact had gotten very close then disappeared from their radar and that they had been unable to regain radar contact with it. I again asked if the EVA DANIELSON indicated that they had felt a collision and if we had specifically asked that question. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that we had and that they indicated that they felt no shudder, sound, etc.

I asked where in our AOR the EVA DANIELSON had departed from, the response was Richmond 19/Levin's and that they were headed for Portland. Mr. [REDACTED] also indicated that they had been able to contact the other fisherman

g.h.

in the area and that they all appeared to have accounted for each other. Mr. [REDACTED] also indicated that there were plans for a helo to conduct a radar search, but he did not know if it was airborne.

He then reported things were otherwise slow at that point, that there was a report of a disabled vessel in the Bar Channel and that visibility was poor into the central bay. I thanked him for his thorough brief, asked him to pass on a "good job" to the watch team and we ended the call.



21 July 07

The following is a statement from Mr. [REDACTED] GS-12, San Francisco Vessel Traffic Watch Supervisor.

I was the watch supervisor on watch during the July 13th incident with the freight ship Eva Danielsen and fishing vessel Buona Madre. Visibility remained extremely poor within San Francisco's Central Bay and its offshore approaches to the San Francisco Pilot Station. The watch was optimally manned with four controllers and myself, as the watch supervisor. The controllers were on a 1 hour sector rotation.

The Eva Danielsen checked in at Point Reyes out bound for sea, this was a routine call; after clearing Point Reyes a fishing vessel had called the outbound ship on channel 12 VHF-FM. Mr. [REDACTED] was the offshore controller at that time and put both the Eva Danielsen and the fishing vessel "Martha" in contact with each other so passing arrangements could be made on channel 12. We understood the name of the fishing vessel was the "Martha" later to be confirmed as the F/V Marja. Arrangements were made between the two vessels. The watch relief was made shortly after this between Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED]. Mr. [REDACTED] briefed the arrangements between the Eva Danielsen and the fishing vessel to the oncoming controller.

At approximately 1714T, the Eva Danielsen called reporting a possible collision with a fishing vessel. The Eva Danielsen had already slowed and turned to commence their search. After gathering the initial information from the Eva Danielsen, I then notified the Sector Command Center (SCC), BMI [REDACTED]. After completing the brief with the SCC, I had Mr. [REDACTED] obtain any additional information from the Eva Danielsen. The Eva Danielsen believed that the F/V Martha may have been the vessel they had the collision with. I had Mr. [REDACTED] make calls out to the F/V Martha on channel 12, 13 and 16. These calls yielded no responses.

The SCC called on the Tandberg Video Conference line to obtain an update. Mr. [REDACTED], manning the watch assistance position, handled most of the communication between VTS and the SCC through the Tandberg. This consisted of updating them on the current situation and any additional information that was coming in.

At 1726T, we asked the Eva Danielsen for an update on their status and if had they located the F/V. The Eva Danielsen reported they were waiting for the crew to report back from the bow on any signs of damage. Shortly afterwards I had Mr. [REDACTED] obtain a contact number or Inmarsat number and current visibility. An Inmarsat number was provided along with a visibility of 200 to 300 meters.

At 1731T, I called the Operations Director, Mr. [REDACTED], to brief him on the incident.

Mr. [REDACTED] suggested that we conduct a UMIB. I concurred and Mr. [REDACTED] conducted a UMIB of a possible collision off Point Reyes on channel 16, requesting for any assistance and to response to VTS on channel 12.


Shortly after the broadcast I had Mr. [REDACTED] query the Eva Danielsen as to why they believed they had a collision per the SCC request of VTS. The Master reported he was not on the bridge at the time of the possible collision, but the 2nd mate had a radar contact come extremely close then he lost the radar track. There was no noise, shudder or any other physical indication of a collision.

An unknown fishing vessel responded along with the F/V K.B. to VTS's UMIB on channel 12. The F/V K.B. was able to verify the name of the F/V as the Marja not the Martha. They would attempt to reach the F/V Marja to verify their status. The Marja then responded on channel 12 and confirmed they had made arrangements with the Eva Danielsen and passed safely. They also identified another vessel, the F/V Rouge in the general area and would contact them to verify their safety. Several other vessels responded on channel 12 obtaining information as to what was happening. This information was passed to SCC via the Tandberg video line. Shortly after this information was passed to the SCC the F/V Marja was able to verify that the F/V Rouge was safe.

After reviewing all the information both Mr. [REDACTED] and I conferred with the SCC over the Tandberg video line, the consensus was that this was a false alarm. Several of the fishing vessels in the area seemed to be able to account for each other and with the Eva Danielsen reporting no physical damage to their vessel this lead to the belief of a false alarm. SCC gave permission to release the Eva Danielsen. At 1749T,

I instructed Mr. [REDACTED] to notify the Eva-Danielsen that provided they have no further information to pass or any other concerns that the Coast Guard was releasing them and they could proceed to the NPOC. The Eva-Danielsen again confirmed that they had been unable to locate any debris and they had found no physical damage on the bow of the vessel to indicate a collision. Therefore, they would turn and continue their voyage.

Operation Director was brief on outcome of events.



JUL 23 2007

STATEMENT ICO MR. [REDACTED]
VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST/ESO, GS-11

On July 13, 2007 I [REDACTED] was employed as a Vessel Traffic Management Specialist during the swing shift (14400-2200) at CG Vessel Traffic Service Branch San Francisco. There were four controllers assigned to the watch on the particular day making us optimally manned. We stood one hour rotations at each watch station to include the Watch Assistant Position.

There was fog throughout the offshore sector extending into the San Francisco Central Bay north of Alcatraz to the Berkeley Pier.

At or about 1714, I overheard the what I believe to be the Master of the M/V Eva Danielson contact VTS SF on CH 12 stating that he believed that he had hit a fishing boat. The master continued to state that his second mate had made passing arrangements with a fishing boat earlier that evening and there was no response. The master also transmitted his Latitude and Longitude. This position in correlation with our AIS signal corresponded to a location approximately 6 NM west of Pt Reyes.

I continued to listen for any further transmissions and waited to provide assistance to the Watch Supervisor and to the newly qualified Vessel Traffic Management Specialist Mr. [REDACTED] manning the offshore sector.

At or about Mr. [REDACTED] conducted a SECURITE Broadcast on CH 12, 13, and 16 for the F/V Martha with no response.

At or about 1722, Mr. [REDACTED] has received an update from the M/V Eva Danielson stating they still are conducting their search and have had no radar or visual sightings. The master reported that they had a radar contact come close then lost it. They felt no shuddering and did not notice anything unusual, just the lost of the radar track close aboard and not relocating it again. They decided to error on the side of caution and assumed they hit a F/V.

At or about 1725, the Sector Command Center contacted VTS via the Tandberg Video Conference Line with further inquiries of the details that took place. VTS was still in contact with the M/V Eva Danielson awaiting on update on their search. The did come to all stop and was in the process of turning around to retrace their route. Also a visual inspection was being conducted by the crew. The SCC requested we keep the Tandberg Video Conference Line open, we agreed.

At this point I recommended to the Watch Supervisor, Mr. [REDACTED] that we conduct a UMIB on CH 16 and CH 12. He agreed as he continued to field phone calls.

At or about 1737 I conducted a UMIB on CH 16 and CH 12 stating a possible collision had occurred in vicinity of Point Reyes with the F/V Martha and M/V Eva Danielson. I also stated that any vessel in the area keep a sharp look out and provide assistance if necessary. One mariner called on Ch 12 requesting that I repeat the Latitude and Longitude. I complied.

Based on my experience at VTS San Francisco, fisherman monitor their working frequencies at times and that would be another option to locate the F/V Martha if there was no collision. I recommended to the Watch Supervisor that we attempt to hail any willing fisherman to provide us a working frequency so we can make a broadcast for F/V Martha since there was a negative response on earlier broadcast conducted by Mr. [REDACTED] on CH 12, 13, and 16. Mr. [REDACTED] agreed.

At or about 1737 I conducted a broadcast on channel 16 for any Fishing Vessels in the area of Point Reyes to contact VTS on channel 12. This initiated feedback from fisherman who were trying to hail the F/V Marja to check on their well being via their local working frequencies.

I contacted the Sector Command Center on the Tandberg Video Conference line to report the actual F/V name of "MARJA" versus "MARTHA" which was our understanding.

At about 1741 I overheard the M/V Eva Danielsen contact VTS on Ch 12 reporting no physical damage seen on the vessel's hull. Seconds later the F/V Marja calls on channel 12 reporting they had made passing arrangements with the Eva Danielsen and they had passed safely. A second vessel was in the area with them, the F/V Rouge, according to the F/V Marja. The Marja stated they would check with them to ensure they were okay.

This information was relayed to the SCC on the Tandberg Video Conference Line that all vessels involved in making those passing arrangements indeed were safe in conjunction with the Watch Supervisor, Mr. [REDACTED].

At or about 1800 I rotated to the off position on a break.

[REDACTED]
Vessel Traffic Management Specialist/ESO
Sector San Francisco VTS Branch

20 July 2007

Statement concerning Freight Ship EVA Danielson event 13JULY2007

GS-11

Vessel Traffic Management Specialist

On July 13th at 1700, I relieved MR [REDACTED] in the watch position of Ocean/Delta Operator. During the relief process, Mr. [REDACTED] advised me that the Freight Ship Eva Danielson had made passing arrangements with the Fishing Vessel "Martha" on VHF CH 13.

Then at 1715 I received a call from the Eva Danielson, VHF CH 12. The master of the vessel stated that he believed they had collided with a small fishing vessel. He also stated that he was turning the vessel in order to begin searching.

I asked the master to repeat the information.

OPCENTER supervisor, MR. [REDACTED] called the Sector Command Center and began briefing the watch of the incident.

I proceeded to take amplifying information from the vessel such as position and onscene visibility. I also asked the master if they thought that it was the "F/V Martha" that they had collided with. He answered in the positive.

MR [REDACTED] was stationed in the Bay Right/Watch Assist Position and began transmitting UMIB's and Securite broadcasts on various VHF marine band channels including 12, 13, and 16.

The master of Eva Danielson described losing RADAR contact with a small object upon passing. He further stated that he and his crew observed and heard no sounds or "shudder" to his vessel to indicate any noticeable actual collision.

I attempted to hail the "F/V Martha". Eventually I received a response from the F/V Marja and confirmed with them that they had indeed made the passing arrangements with Eva Danielson. The Captain of F/V Marja advised me that his vessel and another fishing vessel he identified as "Rogue" were transiting within close proximity during the crossing of the Eva Danielson. He further stated that both vessels had crossed the Eva Danielson safely. The captain of F/V Marja also advised that he believed a radar contact approximately 2nm's north of his position was the F/V Rogue. I asked the captain of the Marja to contact the Rogue, which he did and confirmed the vessels' position and safety.

During the course of this event, all of this information was passed to the OPCENTER Supervisor and relayed to the Sector Command Center.

The master of Eva Danielson reported to me that the vessel crew had inspected his vessel and did not see any signs of damage or collision. I misunderstood this statement and asked him to repeat it. He repeated that there was no damage to his vessel. This information also was passed to MR [REDACTED] who relayed to the Sector Command Center.

At approximately 1750, I was instructed to advise the master of EVA Danielson that the vessel was authorized to proceed on its journey.

JUL 23 2007

Statement regarding events of the Eva Danielsen incident off Point Reyes on 13 July 2007.

My name is [REDACTED]. I work as a Vessel Traffic Management Specialist at Coast Guard Sector San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service Branch. I am a GS-11 step 9.

On Friday 13 July 2007 from approximately 1600 to 1702 I was working at the Ocean-Delta ("offshore") sector. The small freight ship Eva Danielsen had departed the San Francisco offshore precautionary area northbound. The vessel checked in at approximately 1642 at Point Reyes, which is an intermediate reporting point in the VTS system. The ship's mate reported visibility of one-quarter nautical mile.

I was about to be relieved at 1700 – my relief was standing nearby – when I heard on channel 12 a fishing vessel calling the ship departing the traffic lane off Point Reyes. I responded to the fishing vessel, whose name I thought was "Martha," and told the mariner about the Eva Danielsen. I told the mariner to go ahead and talk to the Eva Danielsen on "this" channel (channel 12).

I was then relieved of the sector, and moved over to the Bay sector. In a short while, I heard the watch supervisor (Mr. [REDACTED]) and the Ocean-Delta controller (Mr. [REDACTED]) speaking about a collision offshore. The volume of traffic in the Bay sector was moderate – busy enough that I could not disengage myself to find out more about the incident or help in some way. I continued to manage the Bay sector traffic until about 1800.

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commanding Officer
U.S. Coast Guard
Sector Portland

Investigations Division
Phone: (503) 240-9411
Fax: (503) 240-9345

WITNESS STATEMENT FORM

Please Print Clearly:

Witness Name:

Street Address:

City/State/Zip:

Phone No:

Position:

MASTER

Employer Name:

Employer Address:

City/State/Zip:

Phone No:

License/Doc. #

I, the undersigned, make the following statement voluntarily, without threat, duress or promise of reward:

13TH OF JULY AT 1210 SAILED OUT OF SAN FRANCISCO, AT 1445
PILOT DISEMBARKED, AS AGREED PILOT INFORM TRAFFIC CENTER
THAT VESSEL PROCEEDING TOWARD BUOY "N", AT 1520 REPORTED AT
BUOY "N" AND INFORM TRAFFIC CENTER SPEED, COURSE AND ETA TO
POINT ROYES, AHEAD OF POINT ROYES CALL TRAFFIC CENTER AND
INFORM THEM THAT INTENTION IS TO PROCEED 5-6 MILES IN SAME
COURSE (303) AND THEN TO ALTER COURSE TO 324 TILL THE OUTER
LIMIT OF TRAFFIC SKIM, SAW 5-6 FISHING VESSELS BUT THEY
WERE ON DISTANCE GREATER THAN 20M FROM INTENDED ROUTE
THERE WERE 2 FISHING VESSELS NORTH AND IT WAS VISIBLE THAT
WHEN VESSEL ALTER COURSE THAT THEY WILL BE CLOSE I WAS
DISCUSS SITUATION WITH SECOND MATE BUT DUE TO PAIN IN GAIN
I HAVE TO GO TO TOILET. IN THE MEAN TIME SECOND MATE
AFTER ESTIMATED APT 10 MINUTES SECOND MATE CALL ME WITH WORDS
CAPTAIN WE HIT FISHING BOAT I DID NOT HEAR OR FEEL
ANY UNUSUAL VIBRATIONS OR SIMILAR BUT ON THE BRIDGE
IMMEDIATELY SLOW DOWN ENGINE AND START TO TURNING IN
OPPOSITE COURSE OVER STARBOARD SIDE AT THE SAME TIME I INFORM
TRAFFIC SERVICE THAT THERE MAY BE POSSIBILITY OF COLLISION
AFTER THAT IN COORDINATION WITH TRAFFIC CENTER, I WAS MAKING

I have read the above statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

DATE

Prepared by:

Witnessed by:

g.m

Continuation sheet for witness statement.

Witness Name: _____

CIRCLE AND TRY TO FIND IF WE REALLY HIT SOMEONE
CROW WAS SENT TO CHECK BOW AND SIDES OF THE
VESSEL BUT THEY COULD NOT SEE ANY DAMAGE, OF
WHICH I ALSO INFORMED TRAFFIC CENTER
WITH HELP OF TRAFFIC CENTER TWO VESSELS WHICH
WERE IN VICINITY WERE IDENTIFIED, AND THEY CONFIRMED
THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSING WITH THEM WERE MADE
AND THAT MY VESSEL ALTER COURSE AND PASS THEM SAFELY
AFTER THAT TRAFFIC CENTER GIVE INFORMATION THAT WE
CAN PROCEED

I have read the above statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct.


SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

16.07.07.
DATE

Prepared by:
Witnessed by:

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commander
U.S. Coast Guard
Sector Portland

6767 N Basin Ave.
Portland, OR 97217
Staff Symbol: Inv
Phone: (503) 240-9309
Fax: (503) 240-9345

WITNESS STATEMENT FORM

Please Print Clearly:

Witness Name: [REDACTED] Employer Name: MARIN CONSULT
Street Address: [REDACTED] Employer Address: SPLIT, KASTEL
City/State/Zip: [REDACTED] City/State/Zip: CROATIA
Phone No: [REDACTED] Phone No: [REDACTED]
Position: 2ND MATE License/Doc. #: [REDACTED]

EVAN DANIELSON

I, the undersigned, make the following statement voluntarily, without threat, duress or promise of reward:

I saw that I saw her on the screen and confirmed
July 13th about 1130 pilot came on board at about 1200
underberthing. I was on aft part after underberthing I went
on the bridge, and I take control rudder while pilot
was on the bridge. After pilot leaving course was 303.
While in this course captain called VTS (SAN FRANCISCO)
vessel traffic service, that we pass first buoy "N"
second point of VTS it was point Reyes, traffic advice
asked our course, speed, visibility, course was 303, speed
about 12 kt, visibility about 200-300 meters. On the radar
screen was plenty fishing vessel, but 2 fishing vessel
was starboard side MAREX, 2.5 miles from W. SAN FRANCISCO
vessel traffic service advise MAREX about my future course. When
I talked EVA DANIELSON, I reply on Ch 12 and made communication
with MAREX, about 23 minutes before. Captain said me to go in to let
I made deal with MAREX that I will pass astern of MAREX. In that
moment I was only on the bridge and 1710 I altered course to 324
and look ahead on the "MAREX". Few minutes later I saw MAREX
like bit ahead of the 454 vessel and immediately advised
master by phone. and I said that I think that I hit, but not
feel nothing. Master coming immediately and called SAN FRANCISCO

I have read the above statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct.

[REDACTED]
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

16.07.07
DATE

Prepared by:
Witnessed by:

Page 1 of 3

1 of 2

9.2

Continuation sheet for witness statement.

Witness Name:

Vessel traffic service. Speed was reduced and turn around vessel in contrary course and we looked at it can we see something. It was fog, and visibility about 200-300 meters maybe less. Vessel traffic service called fishing vessel Margy, Margy confirm that she is O.K., also fishing vessel near Margy, when I altered course in 324° it was all clear on the radar. I planned to pass off of Margy on course 324°, I was pass Margy and fishing vessel near the Margy and was off on the screen of radar my starboard side was clear. When we altered in contrary course we looking about 35 minutes. after that vessel traffic service contacted all fishing vessel near of us and when confirm that everybody O.K. said that we can proceed. we gave immarsat phone number to vessel traffic service in order to contact us if they needed

I have read the above statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

DATE

16.07.07

Prepared by:

Witnessed by:

Page 2 of 2

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MV EVA DANIELSON

07.17.07

14 July 07 I Received a call from ENS [REDACTED] from Investigation shop IO San Francisco stating they had a body from the Fishing vessel FV BOUNA MADRE # CS7812TT and believed the coastal freighter MV EVA DANIELSON # 8603535 -enroute to Portland, OR- possibly collided with them, since it was in the vicinity of the FV and made a ch16 call stating they possibly hit another vessel.

Through interview of the Master, Second mate of MV and conversation w/ENS [REDACTED] these are the events as explained to me:

13 July 07 1650 MV EVA DANIELSON was Underway U/W sailing at approximately 12kts, visibility reported to be in and out of half distance from bridge to the bow and .25 mi ahead "the thickest I've ever seen"-Second mate. The bridge lookout consisted of the Second Mate and Master who was acting as one of the required watch standers, both members where operating on 7.5hrs of sleep. Master states "with this small of a crew we are worked harder and it makes no sense to have an AB on watch when I'm required to be here anyway, so I sent him to his rack". MV was working crossing situations w/ two local Fishing Vessels FV's at the time as well as were in radio communications w/ San Francisco Vessel Traffic Services VTS who were keeping traffics schemes.

Master stated the radars were painting 1.5mi and 3mi when he left the bridge to go below to take a head call, during this time second mate reports seeing a contact abeam the starboard bow and believed to have struck the contact. Second mate immediately notified Master who reported to the bridge and pulled vessel back to all stops, turned vessel to contrary, finally reported on Ch 16 that "We think we hit something" notifying VTS at that time. MV regained radio contact with the two crossing FV's to ensure their safety who reported good seaworthy state and not aware of any other vessels in the area. The MV then posted crewmembers to search for wreckage and inspect MV for possible damage. Crew of MV all reported back with negative results. MV was on scene O/S for approximately 35min before being released by VTS to proceed to Portland, OR.

O/S w/MV at T-6 berth 603 I noticed the Bulbous bow had dark baby blue and deep red paint marks on it approximately same color of FV in question as well as fresh scrapes possibly from the FV masts. I took multiple pictures at that time, later I was able to gather paint chips and close up pictures via CG small boat.

CPO [REDACTED] and Civilian Intelligence officer [REDACTED] conducted interviews and gathered the body of the statements as I gathered external evidence from the vessel.

The master seemed overworked and very willing to compensate his crew and give them rest at any available opportunity. He admitted to "manipulating" the work logs to appease Port State Control PSC stating "I wouldn't have a job if I put the actual man hrs expended." I received a good Captain with 30+ yrs of sailing knowingly cutting corners to benefit his crewmembers and obviously concerned with the disposition of the missing FV.

This statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge this 17th day of July 2007.

[REDACTED]
Investigating Officer
Sector Portland

07-18-07

On the 16th of July 2007 at approximately 1030 I was dispatched to the M/V EVA DANIELSON. When I arrived on scene I observed the bulbous bow of the vessel and found patches of blue paint and patches of red paint consistent with the paint scheme of a fishing vessel reported sunk in the area that the M/V EVA DANIELSON had transited on 13 July 2007 when they reported possibly colliding with an unknown vessel. I along with LT [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then boarded the vessel and went to the Captains office to conduct interviews with the Captain and Second Mate.


I arrived in the captain's office and introduced myself and the other two people with me. I then began my interview by asking a few basic questions and asking the Captain to tell me what happened on July 13th 2007 when the Second Mate thought he had struck a fishing vessel.

During the interview the master stated that he had let the lookout watch go below for food and rest. He stated that because of the size of the crew that he rarely used the lookout watches even in heavy fog like they had transited on the 13th of July 2007, and he stated that because he was on the bridge he was taking the place of the lookout watch. This was corroborated by the second mate and to a lesser extent by one of the AB's on deck due to a language barrier. The Captain stated that just after a check in with the VTS just south of Point Reyes giving course speed and weather he left the bridge to use the bathroom due to a medical condition. He stated that he did not get a relief for his watch prior to departing. The master stated that both radars were on and that they could see many fishing boats in front of them but that all but two were from three to six miles off. The Captain and Second Mate both admitted that no fog horn was on during the entire event. After the Captain left the bridge the Second Mate continued on to the next turn and after making the turn determined that he was in a closing situation with the two closest fishing vessels seen on radar. The Second Mate then radioed the two vessels and made a passing arrangement to pass astern of their vessels. This is confirmed through VTS, however no deviation is noted on the charts and no part of the deviation or incident is noted in the vessels logs. Shortly after the Second Mate made a deviation of course to avoid collision with the fishing vessels that they had talked to on the radio the Second Mate stated that he was watching the radar when he lifted his head up and thought he saw the mast of a fishing boat close off the starboard side approximately abeam. He then stated he immediately called the Captain and told him that he thought he had hit a fishing boat. The Captain stated that he then ran to the bridge slowed the vessel, turned to starboard and started a search as well as radioing VTS reporting the incident. Master admitted to falsifying work hours log for crew, admitting to working them many more hours than logged.

Upon further investigation of the ships manuals plans, logs, procedures and charts potential discrepancies were noted in the following documents..

1. Passage Plan: Not properly filled out or followed including page 4 of eight, fog signals.
2. Log of Operations: Not properly filled out according to operations manual.
3. Chief Officer's Log Book: Has AB's listed as lookout, but they were not used on the date in question, by admission of the Captain and corroborated by the Second Mate, and were rarely used as look out. Also none of the incident was logged, in violation of the operations manual.
4. Ships Operations Manual: 3.01.03.01, 3.02.03.09, 3.04.03.01, 3.04.03.02, 3.04.03.05, 3.04.03.12, 3.04.03.13, 3.04.04.01.
5. Checklist for Key Shipboard Operations 3.4(b) not completed by Captain or Second Mate.
6. Personnel and Training Manual (P&T Manual) 2.02, composition of watches.
8. Bridge Instructions: not followed or violated in the following sections; The Master, The Officer of the Watch, Lookout, Navigation, Anti-collision, Restricted Visibility and Relief of the Watch.
7. Shipboard Working Arrangements: Master admits to being completely inaccurate.
9. Standing Orders.
10. Masters Navigation Audit Checklist page one Item eleven?

8-20-02


Investigating Officer
Sector Portland

MY NAME IS [REDACTED], I OWN AND OPERATE
THE F/V ROGUE, ON JULY 13 2007 WE WERE
FISHING NEAR THE WEST END OF THE NORTH BOUND
FISHING LANES, VISIBILITY WAS VERY POOR ALL DAY
-T AROUND 1700 HRS, MY POSITION WAS N 37° 55' 00"
23° 00' 00", WE WERE TACKLING TO THE WEST
WITH ALL GEAR OUT TROLLING FOR SALMON, MAKING
? KNOTS. I HEARD THAT THERE WAS A SHIP OUTBOUND
AND I HAD THE SHIP'S TARGET ON RADAR,
BEARING WAS CONSTANT AND RANGE WAS DECREASING
RAPIDLY, I CHANGED COURSE TO 180 PSC
AND INCREASED SPEED TO 5 KNOTS UNTIL THE
BEARING CHANGED TO THE LEFT AND THE
SHIP PASSED 400 YARDS ASTERN OF THE ROGUE.
- I NEVER HEARD A SHIP'S WHISTLE, OR NOTICED ANY
REDUCTION OF SPEED, ONCE THE THREAT OF COLLISION
HAD PASSED, WE HEARD THAT THE SHIP MAY HAVE
HIT THE F/V MARTA, WE STARTED TO SEARCH AT
THE CENTER OF THE OUTBOUND LANE.

WORKING TO THE WEST LOOKING FOR WRECKAGE OR
SURVIVORS, WE HEARD THAT THE F/V MARTA
WAS OK. SO WE CALLED OFF THE SEARCH WENT
TO DRAKES BAY TO ANCHOR UP. THE NEXT
MORNING HEADING OUT WE FOUND WRECKAGE
AND THE F/V CALIFORNIA. 3/10/1 Found The Body.



JUL 14 2007

Statement of
BMCS [REDACTED]
OIC Station Bodega Bay

Loss of F/V Buena Madre and Mr. Paul Wade
13 - 14 July 2007

On Friday the 14th of July I was the Command Duty Officer (CDO) at Station Bodega Bay. BM1 [REDACTED] was the Senior Duty Officer (SDO) and BM2 [REDACTED] was the Officer of the Day (OOD).

At approximately 1745 I was at my residence on Tracen Petaluma and received a phone call from the SDO who informed me that the duty watch stander at the station had heard a Pan Pan from Sector San Francisco about a possible collision off of Point Reyes, an area within our area of responsibility. As was policy, the OOD sounded the SAR Alarm and launched the Motor Life Boat 47305 to investigate; without awaiting notification from the Sector.

At approximately 1752, I received another phone call from the SDO stating that Sector had determined that no collision had occurred and that the 47305 had been directed to return to station.

The following morning, the 14th of July at approximately 0845, I received a phone call from the Station that a person in the water had been located in roughly the same area as the initial report of the collision the day prior by another commercial fishing vessel, initial reports were that the person was deceased.

I arrived at the station at roughly 0915 and directed that second boat be lit off in the event another asset would be required. I made my way to the tower and found out that the crew of the 47305 was on the way back to the station performing CPR. I talked with Mr. [REDACTED] in the Sector Command Center, I suggested that I move the 2nd boat to the area in which the debris was found and commence a sector search pattern, single unit (VS) until a more definitive search was passed from the Sector Command Center, as there was a report that a vessel at the Spid Point Marina had possibly seen a second person on the boat. I also recommended that, based on our recent high case load that we keep the first boat at the Station as a search and rescue asset near the station, and so that we minimize underway hours on the crew should a second resource be required on scene. Mr. [REDACTED] concurred.

At approximately 1035 the 47305 with Mr. [REDACTED] moors at the Station. CPR is still in progress. Bodega Fire Rescue pronounces Mr. Wade dead. Mr. Wade was wearing a type 1 life jacket with an activated distress light when picked up by the crew, it had been removed by the crew to conduct CPR, but the light was still activated. He was placed in a body bag and stored in one of the unit garages to await the Sonoma County Coroner. He shows up at approximately 1505 at transports Mr. Wade. I debriefed the crew of the 47305 and offered a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing; the crew seemed to be handling

the situation well. I reviewed the Employee Assistance Program and provided the toll-free number.

Throughout the day I worked with Sector's Investigation Branch, LT [REDACTED] and ENS [REDACTED], both of whom were onboard that station and were of tremendous value in making things happen, such as the jurisdiction issues with the coroner.

At 1458 the Sonoma County Sheriff's boat moored at the station and unloaded debris from the F/V Buena Madre; including a fish box with lid, a survival suit, a fish gaff, a life jacket and a section of the hull.

At 1527 the 47257 moors up at the station, I debriefed the crew and departed Bodega Bay at approximately 1600.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge.

[REDACTED]

Officer in Charge
USCG Station Bodega Bay

JUL 13 2007

Statement of BM2 [REDACTED]

On the morning of July 14th, 2007 I was recalled by the Station at 0915T I arrived onboard the Station and was directed to take MLB 47257 to the location of the debris field off of Point Reyes to search for another possible PIW. I was underway at 0952T en-route to the debris field; I was passed a Parallel Search Pattern and arrived at the CSP at 1030T. In the course of the search we observed a number of scupper boards, and various small debris; upon completion of the sixteen leg pattern we requested direction from the OSC (USCGC Hawksbill). At 1339T OSC released us to return to station by conducting a shoreline search, this search also yielded no further results. MLB 47257 was secured and moored safely at 1527T, the crew was debriefed, and OIC discussed counseling options and the availability of resources for anyone who would like to talk to a counselor.

The above statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge

[REDACTED]

JUL 14 2007

Statement of events taken place 13 July 07 -- 14 July 07 regarding Station Bodega Bay

At 1735 13 July 07 I (BM2 [REDACTED] P.O.O.D) was notified by the Station watch stander (SN [REDACTED]) that he had herd a PAN PAN over the radio on channel 16 from Sector San Francisco about a vessel collision in position 38 00.865' N 123 08.99' W. I informed SN [REDACTED] that I would call Sector San Francisco and find out what was going on. I call Sector and spoke with Mr. [REDACTED]. I asked Mr. [REDACTED] what was going on, he told me that he was just getting ready to call Station about a possible vessel collision in position 38 00.865' N 123 08.99' W. I told Mr. [REDACTED] that I was getting a 47 MLB underway and that he could up date my watch stander with up dated information. I then called the watch tower and told him to hit the SAR alarm about a vessel collision south. I dressed out with the first boat crew and was underway on the MLB 47305 at 1740 13 July 07. Station Bodega Bay watch stander was contacted by Sector San Francisco at 1740 13 July 07 and told that MLB 47305 could R.T.B because the collision had never taken place. Station watch stander called MLB 47305 and informed MLB to stand down due to no collision and to R.T.B. MLB 47305 arrived back at station Bodega Bay at 1810 13 July 07.

At 0839 14 July 07 the SAR alarm was hit with a report of a P.I.W. South. I dressed out along with the first boat crew and was underway on the MLB 47305 at 0843. Station Bodega Bay watch stander call MLB with on scene position and stated that fishing vessel California Girl was on scene with the P.I.W. California Girl told Station Bodega Bay that the P.I.W. was not breathing and looked to be dead. MLB 47305 arrived on scene at 0920 with the P.I.W. F/V California Girl had the P.I.W. along side there boat. I maneuvered the MLB to pick up the P.I.W. MK3 [REDACTED] and SN [REDACTED] got a hold of the P.I.W. I left the helm and went to the aft deck to help bring the PIW on

board. I helped MK3 [REDACTED] and SN [REDACTED] get the victim to the aft deck where I started making my patient assessment. I instructed SN [REDACTED] to cut off the victims PFD and shirt. MK3 [REDACTED] maintained head control and I put in an NPA (nasal passage airway). MK3 [REDACTED], SN [REDACTED] and I started CPR. I was unable to get any breaths to go into the victim so MK3 [REDACTED] and SN [REDACTED] continued with chest compressions while I contacted Station Bodega Bay and Sector San Francisco with the status of victim. BM3 [REDACTED] navigated the MLB back to Bodega Bay Harbor and FN [REDACTED] stood lookout. I asked the Station to contact Bodega Bay Fire and have them standing by at Station to assess the victim after MLB moored. MLB 47305 moored at Station and Bodega Bay Fire Dept. assessed the victim and pronounced him dead.

Events to place to the best of my recollection

[REDACTED]

2nd Class Boatswains Mate USCG

JUL 14 2007

Statement of Actions at Station Bodega Bay on July 13-14, 2007
MK3 [REDACTED]

While standing 2nd boat crew on July 13, I received a page from the station around 1745. I was in route and was told to stand down about 5 minutes after the page.

While standing 1st boat engineer on July 14, at about 0839 the S.A.R. alarm went off, stating that there was a person in the water south. Within about 5 minutes the ready crew was underway and in route to the position. While in route we received the GPS position 38° 05 N, 123° 08 W, and calculated our ETA was about 35 minutes. Once we were on scene at 0920, I saw the vessel California Girl circling the person in the water. He was wearing a life jacket and was unresponsive. The MLB pulled alongside the person, SN [REDACTED] and myself pulled him out of the water onto our vessel. Once the victim was on our aft deck BM2 [REDACTED], SN [REDACTED] and myself started CPR. I noticed that the patient was stiff and were not able to get an opened airway. We tried to open the mouth but were unsuccessful. We then used an NPA to try to open the airway and still unsuccessful. I then connected the A.E.D. and placed the pads in the correct positions and the A.E.D. analyzed the patient and said no shock advised and to attend to the patient. At that time SN [REDACTED] and myself were alternating chest compressions while BM2 [REDACTED] was on the phone. It was about a 30-45 minute trip back to the station where EMS was standing by at the pier. Once we moored EMS connected their machine to the patient and pronounced him deceased.

This statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

[REDACTED]

Statement of events from 13 July 2007 to 14 July 2007

JUL 14 2007

On the 13 of July 2007 at 1738 the SAR alarm went off for a vessel collision south. BM2 [REDACTED], MK3 [REDACTED], FN [REDACTED] and I got changed out and underway on the Motor Life Boat 47305. Once underway the watch stander pasted that there was a possible collision of a fishing vessel and a freighter. About 1750 the Station notified us that there was no collision and that we could return to the station.

On the 14 July 2007 at 0839 the SAR alarm went off for a person in the water south. BM2 [REDACTED], MK3 [REDACTED], SN [REDACTED], FN [REDACTED] and I got changed out and under way on the Motor Life Boat 47305. Once underway the station pasted that there was a fishing vessel about seven nautical miles northwest of Point Reyes and they had found a person in the water. It took about thirty minutes to get to the fishing vessels location. Once on scene we came along side the person in the water and pulled the PIW onboard our vessel. I then started to make way back to the station with FN [REDACTED] standing forward look out. I notified the station that it would take about thirty minutes to return to the station. BM2 [REDACTED], MK3 [REDACTED], and SN [REDACTED] started CPR and caring for the PIW and continued until we arrived at the station. I moored the 47305 at our pier where Bodega Bay Fire Department was standing by. Once back at the station Bodega Bay Fire Department pronounced the PIW deceased. This statement is true to the best of my recollection.

[REDACTED]

11 11 2007

Statement of [REDACTED]

On Friday 13th July 2007 at 1740 the Search and Rescues (sar) alarm went off.

The report was a boat collision in the vicinity of Pt. Reyes. We had just passed Bodega Head on the 47 ft. MLB when we were instructed to stand down from the case.

On Friday the 14th July 2007 the sar alarm went off again for a person in the water near Pt. Reyes. The first boat crew left for the location while I stayed back awaiting another coxswain for second boat assistance. Once the second boat coxswain arrived we departed for the site. We then conducted a Creeping line search pattern as directed by sector San Francisco. Once we completed this we conducted a Shoreline search on the way back to Bodega Bay. We fueled and returned to base at approximately 1530.

[REDACTED]
This information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
[REDACTED]

9.w

The statement concerning the incident that took place on,
Friday the 13th and Saturday the 14th of July 2007

On Friday the 13th July 2007 I had just gotten home after being granted standby the time was 1722. My pager went off at 1748 with the sign to come immediately. I called the station while driving there about 5 minutes after I had gotten the page when SN [REDACTED] (the watch stander) told me to stand down it was a possible collision and sector called the boat back. So I at that point returned home and stood by. I received no more pages or calls from Coast Guard Station.

On Saturday the 14th of July 2007. I was onboard the station finishing up my morning deck check offs when at 0839 the SAR (Search And Rescue) alarm went off for a person in the water. Petty Officer [REDACTED] (Coxswain), Petty Officer [REDACTED] (Engineer), Petty Officer [REDACTED] (Break in Coxswain), FN [REDACTED] (Break in Crewmember), and myself SN [REDACTED] (First Boat Crewmember) launched our asset the Motor Life Boat 4730S at 0843. While Traveling South West we the boat crew gathered information from the station and the on scene Fishing Vessel "California Girl". Petty Officer [REDACTED] instructed us to make preparation on board the boat for recovery of a person in the water.

Once on scene at 0920 with the fishing vessel "California Girl" we located the PIW (Person in the water) Petty Officer [REDACTED] and I recovered the victim from the Starboard side recess with assistance from Petty Officer [REDACTED] on the Starboard Aft deck. With the proper PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) on Petty Officer [REDACTED], Petty Officer [REDACTED] and I started CPR on the recovered person. While administering chest compressions and air to the lungs Petty Officer [REDACTED] attached the AED. There was no

shock advised from the AED. With the Motor Life Boat in Route to the station Petty Officer [REDACTED] and myself continued CPR on the recovered person while Petty Officer [REDACTED] Supervised and over looked both Petty Officer [REDACTED] driving of the MLB and Me and Petty Officer [REDACTED] CPR. While FN [REDACTED] assisted Petty Officer [REDACTED] by standing forward lookout.

Once we moored up at the station at 1035. The fire fighters for Bodega Bay came aboard the boat assessed the recovered victim and pronounced the person deceased. Due to the experience of the watch stander who was on watch Petty Officer [REDACTED] asked me to go change out and go help and assist the watch stander. To the best of my knowledge this is the incident that took place on July 14, 2007 at 0839 while underway.

[REDACTED]

14 July 2007

Statement of events taken place on 14 July 2007 by SN [REDACTED]

JUL 14 2007

[REDACTED]:

Saturday morning I was the watchstander as the fishing vessel (F/V) California Girl hailed the Coast Guard on channel 16. The California Girl proceeded to notify me of a person in the water and he didn't appear to be alive. I requested the California Girl to stay on scene to gather further information until the Coast Guard was on scene. I requested sector put out a UMIB for the person in the water and launch a helicopter. The California Girl gave a name of the F/V Buena Madre labeled on the lifejacket the man was wearing with a description of the vessel he was familiar with. Once the UMIB was put out a F/V said he saw the Buena Madre fueling at Spud Point Marina on the 12th of July 2007 with two people on board from approximately 100 yards away. Then another F/V said that he was the Buena Madre's fishing buddy and he was not in his slip on the night of 13 July 2007, and he was positive there was only one person on board. Directly after that another F/V said that she did see the Buena Madre in his slip on the night of 13 July 2007. Shortly after this I was relieved as the watchstander and got underway to conduct search patterns for a possible second person in the water. While underway we found nothing but debris.

The following information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

[REDACTED]
Seaman, USCG

Statement of actions at Bodega Bay on 14JUL07

FN [REDACTED]

Today at 0839 the SAR alarm sounded for a PIW south. I along with the first boat crew dressed out to get underway for a PIW. BM2 [REDACTED], MK3 [REDACTED], BM3 [REDACTED], SN [REDACTED], and myself arrived on scene at 0920 and saw the victim in the water along side fishing vessel "California Girl". MLB pulled along side the victim and I assisted pulling the PIW onboard. Once the victim was onboard I went to the open Bridge of the MLB to stand look out while BM3 [REDACTED] navigated the boat back to Bodega Bay mean while BM2 [REDACTED], MK3 [REDACTED], and SN [REDACTED] assessed the victim and began CPR on the aft deck. They continued CPR until we arrived to the station at 1035 and EMS was waiting at station Bodega Bay where they pronounced the victim deceased. To the best of my knowledge this is the incident that took place on 14JUL07 at 0839 while underway.

[REDACTED]

14JUL07

9.2


JUL 16 2007

Statement of events taken place from 13 to 14 Jul-07

On the 13th of July 2007, at Station Bodega Bay, the first boat crew was called underway to respond to a possible boat collision at Pt. Reyes. While in transit to the scene the MLB 47305 was told to stand down and return to base, and that the collision was a false alarm.

On the 14th of July 2007, at Station Bodega Bay, the second boat crew was called underway to conduct a search pattern for possible persons in the water several miles off Pt. Reyes. While conducting search pattern, very few pieces of debris were found. The search pattern was complete and the MLB 47257 was instructed to conduct a shore search then return to base. The MLB 47257 conducted shore search yielding negative results.

This statement is true and accurate to my best recollection.



Fireman, USCG

9.aa



07/24/2007 12:24 PM

To [REDACTED]

cc

bcc

Subject statement for coast gaurd

please fax to: [REDACTED]

FX# 510-547-3144

437

P.O. 1677

Morro Bay ca. 93443

To: Lieutenant [REDACTED] U.S. coast gaurd

From: [REDACTED] Owner/operator F/V Marja

regaurding: incident that took place on 7-13-07 off of point reyes ca. at position 37.59 N
123.07 W

The following is my statement in regards to the incident that took place on 7-13-07.

On that date I was fishing for salmon with a small fleet just off the end of the northern outbound tanker lane (30 to 40 boats I think). Some of the boats may have been just inside the end of the lane. At about 5 pm I noticed a large bleep on my radar within my 1 mile ring (3/4 of a mile) Approx. I attempted radio contact identifying my position and theirs. vessel traffic identified the ship and we made contact.

I advised them of my pressence off their bow and asked if they saw me? They said they did and would adjust their course to 324 degrees. I asked if that was going to put them off my stern? they said yes. I sat in my cabin and watched my radar until I was sure we would clear. They went by inside my quarter mile ring, but we cleared fine and I went back to work.

I had hit the scan button on that radio and it stopped on another station that was talking. Apparently the tanker thought they hit my vessel and was calling me. I was running my fishing gear (about 20 min.) then I checked the radar again and noticed there was a tanker just to the north of my position, I turned to ch. 12 and heard a conversation about my vessel, the tanker was stopped, and thought he hit my vessel and fishermen were pulling their gear to go look for me. I broke in to the conversation and advised them I was OK. and that I had not observed any vessels on the radar north of my position were the tanker was stopped.

I talked to ben on the Kay Bee, and vessel traffic, and advised the tanker I had not been hit. I advised vessel traffic of the one boat I had seen in the area (rogue) and it was determined to be a false alarm. The tanker said they saw no damage to their boat and was allowed to continue on. I had trolled toward the incident in case someone was in the water I returned to my tack (were I was fishing) and we all thought it was just a close call. Which as we now no it may have been more. I did not hear a horn but as I said I was not in the lanes so it may have been blowing earlier? There was ^{poor} visibility at the time. I could not say if there was enough visability to see

the waterline of a ship from its deck to inspect for damage, but it was very thick. These are the facts as I recall them and this statement is true and correct according to my recollection of that day. the numbers I provided are were I was fishing at the beginning of the incident. 37.59.333n by 123.06.986w

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this matter.



~~Pinpoint customers who are looking for what you sell~~

